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CLEANING UP THE STANDARDS OF THE 
MENTAL HYGIENE LAW: STATE v. DENNIS 
K. AND CIVIL COMMITMENT 
MARIA BENVENUTO* 
Abstract: On July 5, 2016, in State v. Dennis K., the Court of Appeals of New 
York upheld the civil commitment of two individuals in accordance with article 10 
of the Mental Hygiene Law. The majority relied on the testimony of expert wit-
nesses and the individuals’ past criminal records to classify them as possessing a 
“mental abnormality” that predisposes them to commit sexual offenses, a necessary 
element of a civil commitment finding. The court ultimately found the evidence 
presented sufficient to make this classification and indefinitely restrict the freedom 
of such individuals. In contrast, the dissent emphasized the lack of certainty in such 
classifications, specifically in the link between the mental diagnoses of the individ-
uals and their predisposition to commit sexual offenses. In civilly committing indi-
viduals who may not be predisposed to commit sex offenses, the dissent accurately 
argues that the state statute is not serving a legitimate purpose, and is therefore un-
justly infringing on the substantive due process rights of those who commit sexual 
offenses, an already politically unpopular group. 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioners Anthony N. and Richard TT. were each convicted of numerous 
sex offenses at various points throughout their lives.1 In accordance with arti-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2016–2017. 
 1 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW art. 10 (McKinney 2017); State v. Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d 500, 
512–13, 518 (N.Y. 2016). A “sex offense” is an act or acts constituting: 
(1) [A]ny felony defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law, including a sexual-
ly motivated felony; (2) patronizing a person for prostitution in the first degree as defined 
in section 230.06 of the penal law, aggravated patronizing a minor for prostitution in the 
first degree as defined in section 230.13 of the penal law, aggravated patronizing a minor 
for prostitution in the second degree as defined in section 230.12 of the penal law, aggra-
vated patronizing a minor for prostitution in the third degree as defined in section 230.11 
of the penal law, incest in the second degree as defined in section 255.26 of the penal law, 
or incest in the first degree as defined in section 255.27 of the penal law; (3) a felony at-
tempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses set forth in this subdivision; 
or (4) a designated felony, as defined in subdivision (f) of this section, if sexually motivat-
ed and committed prior to the effective date of this article. 
MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(p). Civil commitment is a court-ordered institutionalization of a person who 
suffers from mental illness and poses a danger to himself or to others. Civil Commitment, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER: LAW DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/civil%20commitment [https://
perma.cc/Y2BP-C3CS]. 
2 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
cle 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law, the State of New York commenced separate 
civil commitment hearings for the petitioners, arguing that each was a “de-
tained sexual offender” suffering from a mental abnormality and consequently 
should be civilly committed.2 The State of New York argued that Petitioner 
Anthony N. suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) and Border-
line Personality Disorder (BPD).3 The State similarly argued that Petitioner 
Richard TT. suffered from ASPD, BPD, and psychopathy.4 
                                                                                                                           
 2 MENTAL HYG. art. 10; Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 513–14, 518. Under the Mental Hygiene Law, a 
“detained sex offender” is defined as: 
[A] person who is in the care, custody, control, or supervision of an agency with juris-
diction, with respect to a sex offense or designated felony, in that the person is either: 
(1) A person who stands convicted of a sex offense as defined in subdivision (p) of this 
section, and is currently serving a sentence for, or subject to supervision by the division 
of parole, whether on parole or on post-release supervision, for such offense or for a re-
lated offense; 
(2) A person charged with a sex offense who has been determined to be an incapacitat-
ed person with respect to that offense and has been committed pursuant to article seven 
hundred thirty of the criminal procedure law, but did engage in the conduct constituting 
such offense; (3) A person charged with a sex offense who has been found not respon-
sible by reason of mental disease or defect for the commission of that offense; 
(4) A person who stands convicted of a designated felony that was sexually motivated 
and committed prior to the effective date of this article; 
(5) A person convicted of a sex offense who is, or was at any time after September first, 
two thousand five, a patient in a hospital operated by the office of mental health, and 
who was admitted directly to such facility pursuant to article nine of this title or section 
four hundred two of the correction law upon release or conditional release from a cor-
rectional facility, provided that the provisions of this article shall not be deemed to 
shorten or lengthen the time for which such person may be held pursuant to such article 
or section respectively; or 
(6) A person who has been determined to be a sex offender requiring civil management 
pursuant to this article. 
MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(g). “Mental abnormality” is defined as “a congenital or acquired condition, 
disease or disorder that affects the emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a person in a manner 
that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct constituting a sex offense and that results in 
that person having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct.” Id. § 10.03(i). If an individual is 
found to be a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement and is committed to a secure treatment 
facility, that facility shall provide care, treatment and control of the afflicted until such time that the 
court discharges the individual from civil confinement. Id. § 10.10(a). 
 3 Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 513–14. ASPD consists of “a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and 
violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into 
adulthood.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS 659 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V]. Four criteria to support an ASPD diagnosis include: 
(1) the person is over the age of 18; (2) there is evidence that the person had an onset of conduct dis-
order before the age of 15; (3) the occurrence of antisocial behavior did not “exclusively occur” dur-
ing the course of bipolar disorder or schizophrenia; and (4) the person has displayed “[a] pervasive 
pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others, occurring since the age of 15 . . . .” Id. 
This last criterion can consist of failure to conform to social norms, deceitfulness, impulsivity, irrita-
bility and aggressiveness, reckless disregard for one’s safety or that of others, consistent irresponsibil-
ity, and lack of remorse. See id. Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) consists of “[a] pervasive 
pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity, 
2017] The Mental Hygiene Law: State v. Dennis K. and Civil Commitment 3 
Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law serves to reduce the risks posed to 
society by sexual offenders suffering from mental abnormalities that make 
them more likely to commit sexual offenses, and to provide the appropriate 
treatment to limit such sexual misconduct.5 Therefore, for an offender to be 
civilly committed in an article 10 hearing, a jury must find that the offender 
has a “condition, disease or disorder” that relates to the offender’s predisposi-
tion to commit sexual offenses, and the offender must have “serious difficulty 
controlling” such conduct.6 
                                                                                                                           
beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts” as indicated by five or more of the 
following: 
1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. . . . 
2. A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alter-
nating between extremes of idealization and devaluation. 
3. Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self. 
4. Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g., spending, 
sex, substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating). . . . 
5. Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior. 
6. Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood . . . . 
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness. 
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger . . . . 
9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms. 
DSM-V, supra, at 663. 
 4 Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 519. Psychopathy is a mental disorder or a psychopathic personality, 
which involves “behavior toward other individuals or toward society in which reality is usu. clearly 
perceived except for an individual’s social responsibilities or moral obligations.” Psychopathic Per-
sonality, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (copy. 1984). Psychopathy has been 
recognized as a synonym of antisocial personality disorder in the DSM. DSM-V, supra note 3, at 659. 
 5 MENTAL HYG. § 10.01(d); Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 505. The goals of civil commitment include 
protection of society, supervision of offenders, and management of their behavior. MENTAL HYG. 
§ 10.01(d). 
 6 Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 505 (quoting MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(i)). The State of New York civilly 
manages individuals who suffer from mental abnormalities that predispose them to commit sex of-
fenses by either placing them in “strict and intensive supervision and treatment,” (SIST) in which they 
can live in their communities but are closely supervised by the Division of Parole, or—for more dan-
gerous sex offenders—civilly confine or commit the individual to a psychiatric facility run by the 
Office of Mental Health. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding New York’s Civil Management Law, 
N.Y. STATE DIVISION OF CRIM. JUST. SERVS., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/nsor/som_faqs.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KM8Y-ZMTP]. The formal process for an article 10 civil commitment hearing be-
gins when the commissioner of mental health, after consultation with other mental health profession-
als, coordinates a case review panel that serves the purpose of reviewing cases of detained sex offend-
ers who are approaching release from confinement. MENTAL HYG. § 10.05(a). The case review panel 
reviews relevant medical, clinical, criminal, and institutional records, actuarial risk assessment in-
struments, and other records and reports to determine if the individual convicted of a designated felo-
ny was sexually motivated. Id. § 10.05(b). If the case review team finds that the individual is a sex 
offender requiring civil management, the attorney general will file a sex offender civil management 
petition. Id. § 10.06(a). The individual will submit to an evaluation by a psychiatric examiner. Id. 
§ 10.06(c). Within thirty days of the petitioner filing the sex offender civil management petition, the 
supreme court or county court before which the petition is pending shall conduct a hearing without a 
jury to determine whether there is probable cause to prove the individual is a sex offender requiring 
civil management. Id. § 10.06(g). At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court concludes that there is 
4 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
In each of the Petitioners’ civil commitment hearings, the Supreme Court 
of the State of New York found the Petitioners had mental abnormalities, in 
accordance with section 10.03 of the Mental Hygiene Law, and were thus in 
need of civil commitment.7 The supreme court stated that the Petitioners’ pre-
disposition to commit sexual offenses and their difficulty controlling their urg-
es to commit offenses, which qualified them as a “dangerous sex offender re-
quiring civil confinement, justified such a classification.”8 Both Petitioners 
appealed the supreme court’s orders to the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court, which affirmed in both cases, holding that Petitioners did suffer from a 
“mental abnormality,” as defined by the Mental Hygiene Law, that allows for 
their classification as a dangerous sex offender requiring civil commitment.9 
Following another appeal by Petitioners, the Court of Appeals of New 
York ultimately affirmed Petitioners’ civil commitment in State v. Dennis K.10 
In applying several precedent-setting cases, the Court of Appeals of New York 
held that in each of the Petitioners’ cases the State presented a “detailed psy-
chological portrait” that satisfied both the “predisposition” and “serious diffi-
culty in controlling” sexual misconduct requirements necessary for an article 
10 civil commitment.11 The court of appeals in Dennis K. thus held that the 
                                                                                                                           
not probable cause to designate the individual a sex offender, the individual will be released. Id. 
§ 10.06(k). If the court concludes that probable cause has been established, the court shall: (1) order 
the individual to be released to a secure treatment facility designated by the commissioner for care, 
treatment and control, and (2) set a date for trial in accordance with section 10.07 of the Mental Hy-
giene Law. Id. Within sixty days that the court determines that the individual is a sex offender requir-
ing civil management, the court will conduct a jury trial to determine whether, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, the individual is a sexual offender who suffers from a mental abnormality. Id. 
§ 10.07(a). The burden of proof to prove the individual is a sex offender in need of civil commitment 
is on the attorney general. Id. § 10.07(d). If the jury finds that the individual is a detained sex offender 
who suffers from a mental abnormality, it shall consider whether the individual requires confinement 
or strict and intensive supervision. Id. § 10.07(f). Confinement entails the individual being committed 
to a secure treatment facility for care, treatment, and control until such time as he or she no longer 
requires confinement. Id. The conditions of strict and intensive supervision are articulated in section 
10.11 of the Mental Hygiene Law. Id. § 10.11. 
 7 See MENTAL HYG. § 10.03; Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 515, 520. Note that the citations to trial 
courts are absent in this Comment because parties to article 10 proceedings may seal the record. See 
MENTAL HYG. § 10.08(g). In New York State, the supreme courts are one type of court of first im-
pression. The Courts—General Information, NYCOURTS.GOV (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.courts.
state.ny.us/courts/structure.shtml [https://perma.cc/3T6N-39QA]. Appeals from the supreme courts 
are made to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, and, finally, to the New York Court of Ap-
peals. Id. 
 8 See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 515, 520. 
 9 MENTAL HYG. art. 10; State v. Richard TT., 14 N.Y.S.3d 824, 829 (App. Div. 2015), aff’d sub 
nom. Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d 500; State v. Nervina, 991 N.Y.S.2d 208, 211 (App. Div. 2014), aff’d sub 
nom. Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d 500. 
 10 See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 523. 
 11 See id. at 505, 510–11, 522 (quoting MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(i); then quoting State v. Donald 
DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 248 (2014)). 
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evidence that the State presented was legally sufficient to support the Supreme 
Court of New York’s decision to civilly commit.12 
Part I of this Comment outlines the factual and procedural history of 
Dennis K., including both State v. Anthony N. and State v. Richard TT. Part II 
discusses the majority’s decision in Dennis K. to categorize the Petitioners as 
possessing “mental abnormalities” that require their civil commitment, as well 
as the dissent’s opposition to such classification. Finally, Part III disagrees with 
the court of appeal’s classification of the Petitioners and their requisite civil 
commitment, and emphasizes how the evidence relied upon in the civil com-
mitment proceedings was insufficient to civilly commit and deprive the Peti-
tioners of their substantive due process rights. 
I. THE SUPPORT BEHIND EACH CIVIL COMMITMENT 
Petitioners Anthony N. and Richard TT. exhibited parallel mental diagno-
ses, and made similar challenges to their mental abnormality classifications 
and civil commitments.13 Following decisions of the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of the State of New York in 2014 and 2015, which supported 
their civil commitment, both Petitioners argued that the lower courts lacked 
clear and convincing evidence to prove that their diagnoses predisposed them 
to commit sexual offenses.14 As such, they argued that they could not be 
properly distinguished from typical general recidivist offenders, and were thus 
unfit for civil commitment.15 The Court of Appeals of New York ultimately 
rejected this argument in State v. Dennis K., decided on July 5, 2016, and af-
firmed each of their civil commitments.16 
A. Petitioner Anthony N. 
Anthony N. was convicted of numerous assaults throughout his life.17 On 
June 9, 2010, the State commenced an article 10 civil commitment proceeding, 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See id. at 517, 523. 
 13 See State v. Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d 500, 513, 516, 521–22 (N.Y. 2016). 
 14 See id. at 515–17. 
 15 See id. at 524. 
 16 See id. at 523. 
 17 See id. at 512–13. Convictions included assault in the third degree in 1983, burglary in the third 
degree in 1984, sexual abuse in the first degree in 1993, and attempted burglary in the second degree 
in 2003, the latter of which is considered a “sexually motivated” offense under sections 10.03(f), (p) 
and (s) of the Mental Hygiene Law. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(f), (p), (s) (McKinney 2017); 
Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 512–13. Sexually motivated offenses include “acts constituting a designated 
felony [that] were committed in whole or in substantial part for the purpose of direct sexual gratifica-
tion of the actor.” MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(s). Additionally, Petitioner was also arrested for rape in the 
first degree and burglary in the second degree in 1988. Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 512. Throughout the 
trial and appeals process, Petitioner repeatedly disputed the fact that the attempted burglary was sex-
6 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
claiming that Petitioner, Anthony N., suffered from mental abnormalities under 
section 10.03(i) that consisted of Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) and 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD).18 Petitioner moved to dismiss, arguing 
that the State failed to prove that he had a mental abnormality falling under 
section 10.03(i).19 The Supreme Court of the State of New York denied the 
motion.20 The jury then determined that Petitioner was a detained sex offender 
who suffered from a mental abnormality within the meaning of section 
10.03(i).21 Following the jury’s verdict, the court released Petitioner into Strict 
and Intensive Supervision and Treatment (SIST).22 
In October 2012, after Petitioner allegedly violated the SIST conditions, 
the supreme court held a revocation hearing and concluded that Petitioner was 
a dangerous sex offender necessitating civil commitment.23 Petitioner appealed 
the orders classifying him as a dangerous sex offender, requiring civil com-
mitment, and the order revoking his SIST.24 The Appellate Division of the Su-
preme Court of the State of New York affirmed the lower court’s decision on 
August 8, 2014, and Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals of New 
York.25 On July 5, 2016, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s clas-
                                                                                                                           
ually motivated. Id. at 515–16. If not, the state could not use it to prove that Petitioner was a sex of-
fender in need of civil commitment. Id. 
 18 MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(i); Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 513–14. 
 19 MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(i); Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 514. 
 20 See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 514. Petitioner also argued that his 2003 burglary conviction was 
not sexually motivated. See id. The State’s two psychologists testified at trial that Petitioner felt “enti-
tled” to sex, and due to his BPD, possessed a “desperate need” to have contact with the women he had 
relationships with, or wished to have relationships with, in such a manner that resulted in forcible 
sexual conduct with them. See id. at 525–26. Dr. Thomassen testified that Anthony’s BPD predis-
posed him to commit sex offenses based on uncontrollable urges. Id. at 740. 
 21 See MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(i); Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 515. The jury held that Petitioner’s 2003 
burglary conviction was sexually motivated. See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 515. 
 22 Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 515. SIST may include, but is not limited to: 
electronic monitoring or global positioning satellite tracking for an appropriate period 
of time, polygraph monitoring, specification of residence or type or [sic] residence, 
prohibition of contact with identified past or potential victims, strict and intensive su-
pervision by a parole officer, and any other lawful and necessary conditions that may be 
imposed by a court. 
MENTAL HYG. § 10.11(a)(1). The commissioner of mental health, after consultation with psychiatrists, 
will recommend a specific course of treatment. Id. 
 23 See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 515. The Division of Parole enforces SIST conditions, which can 
include GPS monitoring, no contact with victims, or polygraph monitoring. Frequently Asked Ques-
tions Regarding New York’s Civil Management Law, supra note 6. Although the court did not specify 
which of the conditions Petitioner violated, the court can choose to revoke SIST if one of the condi-
tions is violated or if the treating professional thinks that the individual is a dangerous sex offender in 
need of confinement. Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 515.The court, finding that Petitioner violated at least 
one of the conditions, revoked Petitioner’s SIST. Id. 
 24 See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 515. 
 25 See id.; State v. Nervina, 991 N.Y.S.2d 208, 211 (App. Div. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Dennis K., 
59 N.E.3d 500. The appellate division held that the State presented clear and convincing evidence that 
2017] The Mental Hygiene Law: State v. Dennis K. and Civil Commitment 7 
sifications and decision to civilly commit, finding that the State presented clear 
and convincing evidence proving that Petitioner was a sexual offender requir-
ing civil commitment.26 
B. Petitioner Richard TT. 
Petitioner Richard TT., like Anthony N., was also convicted of numerous 
sex offenses throughout his life.27 In May 2010, the State of New York com-
menced an article 10 civil management proceeding against Petitioner, claiming 
that he suffered from mental abnormalities consisting of ASPD, BPD, and psy-
chopathy.28 The State’s psychologist testified in the proceeding that the combi-
nation of these disorders established a mental abnormality that predisposed 
Petitioner to commit sex offenses because they caused him to lack impulse 
control and display aggression.29 The Supreme Court of the State of New York 
found that Richard TT. did suffer from such mental abnormalities and, as such, 
the court classified him as a dangerous sex offender that required civil com-
mitment.30 Richard TT. appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of the State of New York.31 
During the pendency of Richard TT.’s appeal, the court of appeals issued 
its opinion in State v. Donald DD., redefining the legal sufficiency of certain 
diagnoses, specifically focusing on ASPD, to qualify an offender as suffering 
from a mental abnormality.32 Richard TT. then filed a motion to vacate and 
dismiss the supreme court’s order’s finding that he suffered from a mental ab-
normality within the meaning of section 10.03(i).33 The supreme court granted 
the motion on October 22, 2015 in compliance with Donald DD.34 The State 
then appealed that order to the appellate division, arguing that Petitioner was 
diagnosed with multiple mental disorders that caused impulsive sexual behav-
                                                                                                                           
Petitioner was a sexual offender in need of confinement. Nervina, 991 N.Y.S.2d at 211. The appellate 
division relied on the testimony of expert witnesses who presented evidence that Anthony N. suffered 
from numerous mental disorders, including BPD, which caused him to lack control over his sexual 
urges. Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 514. The Court of Appeals of New York granted Petitioner’s leave for 
appeal, where Petitioner again argued that the State failed to meet its burden in proving that his 2003 
conviction was sexually motivated and that a diagnosis of BPD cannot alone qualify him as pos-
sessing a mental abnormality. Id. at 515, 516–17. 
 26 Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 517–18, 523. Again, the Court of Appeals of New York relied on the 
evidence and testimony presented at the trial court level, demonstrating that Anthony N. was predis-
posed to sexual urges and lack control of such urges due to his mental disorders. Id. at 514–15. 
 27 See id. at 518. Anthony N.’s sex offenses included sexual abuse in the first degree and endan-
gering the welfare of a child in 1999, and rape in the third degree and sexual misconduct in 2007. Id. 
 28 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW art. 10 (McKinney 2017); Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 518–19. 
 29 Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 519–20. 
 30 Id. at 520. 
 31 See id. 
 32 Id. at 506. 
 33 MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(i); Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 520. 
 34 Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 520. 
8 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
ior.35 On August 13, 2015, the appellate division held that the confinement 
conviction should not have been vacated and that the evidence produced by the 
State supported civil commitment.36 After granting leave for appeal, the Court 
of Appeals of New York affirmed July 5, 2016, finding that the Petition did 
suffer from a mental abnormality within the meaning of section 10.03(i) that 
classified him as a dangerous sex offender in need of civil commitment.37 
II. MAJORITY SUPPORT OF NEW YORK CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEDURES 
In State v. Dennis K., a consolidated opinion, the Court of Appeals of New 
York affirmed the decisions of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
the State of New York, finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that both of 
the petitioners, Anthony N. and Richard TT., suffered from a mental abnormality 
under section 10.03 of the Mental Hygiene Law, and thus required civil com-
mitment.38 The opinion, written by Justice Eugene F. Pigott, supported the clas-
sifications and methods employed by the state of New York as fair procedures.39 
Justice Jenny Rivera filed a dissenting opinion in the matter of Anthony N. and 
Richard TT., challenging the degree of certitude in mental diagnosis and related 
impulse predispositions that the majority found to be sufficient before civilly 
committing the petitioners.40 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. at 520–21. The state further argued that the supreme court abused its discretion in vacating 
its order of civil commitment because it misinterpreted Donald DD. Id. The appellate division held 
that the orders finding Richard TT. suffered from a mental abnormality and that he was a dangerous 
sex offender requiring civil commitment were supported by the evidence. Id. The court noted that 
Richard TT. was diagnosed with multiple disorders that caused him to engage in impulsive and inap-
propriate sexual behavior. Id. Therefore, despite the ruling in Donald DD., which questioned the legal 
sufficiency of ASPD to constitute a mental abnormality under the Mental Hygiene Law, the court 
found that all other evidence supported the finding that Richard TT. was a dangerous sex offender 
requiring civil commitment. Id. Two dissenting appellate division judges stated that they were con-
strained by the ruling in Donald DD. and that, therefore, Richard TT.’s civil commitment was not 
justified. Id. at 524, 526 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 36 State v. Richard TT., 14 N.Y.S.3d 824, 829 (App. Div. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Dennis K., 59 
N.E.3d 500 (majority opinion). 
 37 MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(i); Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 523. 
 38 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(i) (McKinney 2017); State v. Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d 500, 
523 (N.Y. 2016); Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
253, 270 (2011). The right to be free from physical restraint is a fundamental liberty, as determined by 
the Supreme Court in Foucha v. Louisiana. Id. (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 
Nonetheless, as held in Addington v. Texas and United States v. Comstock, the courts use intermediate 
scrutiny in assessing civil commitment cases, not strict scrutiny. Id. at 267 (citing Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979); and then citing United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 131 (2010)). 
Strict scrutiny is usually afforded to cases involving fundamental rights. Id. at 264. Intermediate scru-
tiny requires that the standard of proof only be clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 301. Clear and 
convincing evidence amounts to a high degree of probability, not near certainty, which is required 
under strict scrutiny. Id. at 302. 
 39 See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 500–26. 
 40 See id. at 523–26 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
2017] The Mental Hygiene Law: State v. Dennis K. and Civil Commitment 9 
A. The Majority’s Commitment to Current Civil Commitment Procedures 
The procedure to civilly commit an individual, as outlined in the Mental 
Hygiene Law and interpreted through court decisions, requires the State to es-
tablish by clear and convincing evidence that an individual has a “condition, 
disease, or disorder” that affects his “emotional, cognitive, or volitional capaci-
ty . . . in a manner that predisposes him . . . to the commission of conduct con-
stituting a sex offense.”41 New York courts have determined that the Mental 
Hygiene Law and its civil commitment procedures amount to a two-prong 
test.42 The first prong requires that the individual possess a mental abnormality 
as defined by the Mental Hygiene Law.43 The second prong requires both that 
the mental abnormality predispose the individual to commit sexual offenses, 
and that the individual has “serious difficulty controlling” sexual conduct.44 
Petitioner Anthony N. challenged the legal sufficiency of his mental ab-
normality diagnosis.45 Petitioner referenced State v. Donald DD., a court of 
appeals opinion that stated that a diagnosis of ASPD alone was not sufficient to 
constitute a mental abnormality under the Mental Hygiene Law because such a 
diagnosis did not predispose the individual to commit sexual offenses.46 An-
thony N. argued that, like ASPD, BPD was insufficient to qualify as a mental 
abnormality.47 The court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s reliance on Donald 
DD., and held that BPD sufficiently serves as a predisposition to specifically 
commit sexual offenses.48 They found that while one of the traits of BPD is a 
fear of abandonment and a need to restore threatened relationships, Anthony N. 
satisfied these fears and needs by forcing women to have sexual relations with 
him against their will, creating a strong sexual component to his BPD diagno-
sis.49 The court of appeals found this to be sufficient for the State to establish a 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. at 505 (majority opinion). 
 42 See MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(i); Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 502, 506–07. 
 43 See MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(i); Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 505. 
 44 See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 505. 
 45 Id. at 515–17. Petitioner again challenged the fact that his felony conviction was sexually moti-
vated. See id. at 515. In regards to this argument, the court of appeals held that the State presented 
sufficient evidence to conclude that the 2003 attempted burglary was sexually motivated. Id. at 516. 
As evidence of his sexual intentions, the court of appeals relied on the fact that Petitioner arrived at 
the victim’s residence in 2003 with a sex toy and lubricant, and told the victim that he was going to 
rape her. See id. 
 46 Id. at 516–17 (citing State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 240 (N.Y. 2014)). The majority in 
Donald DD. reasoned that ASPD alone only amounts to a tendency to commit general offenses, not 
sexual offenses specifically. 21 N.E.3d at 240. Therefore, individuals afflicted solely by ASPD would 
not satisfy the two-prong test to civilly commit. Id. 
 47 Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 516–17. 
 48 Id. at 517. The court tried to make a distinction between ASPD and BPD, asserting that BPD 
leads to fear of abandonment by the afflicted, which after considering testimony of expert witnesses 
and Petitioner’s past crimes, was manifested through the need to have women against their will. See 
id. 
 49 Id. 
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link between Anthony N.’s BPD and a predisposition to commit sex offenses.50 
The court thus asserted that the two-prong test was met and that Petitioner 
should be civilly committed.51 
Petitioner Richard TT., diagnosed with ASPD, BPD, and psychopathy, al-
so challenged the legal sufficiency of his mental abnormality classification.52 
The court of appeals noted that the combination of ASPD, BPD, and psychopa-
thy were sufficient to qualify Petitioner as suffering from a mental abnormality 
that led to sexual preoccupation and impulsivity.53 Relying on the holding in 
Donald DD. that an ASPD diagnosis could not qualify as a mental abnormality 
unless accompanied by another disorder, the court focused on the fact that 
Richard TT. suffered from multiple disorders.54 The court stated that the com-
bination of ASPD, BPD, and psychopathy creates a personality structure that 
results in a disregard for the needs and wants of other individuals and a lack of 
impulse control, which, based on Petitioner’s past crimes, was manifested 
through sexual offenses.55 The court of appeals held that the supreme court 
misinterpreted the holding in Donald DD. and thus Richard TT. should be civ-
illy committed.56 
B. Dissenting to the Classification 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Jenny Rivera contested the majority’s clas-
sification of Anthony N. and Richard TT. as having mental abnormalities re-
quiring civil commitment.57 Judge Rivera argued that the majority relied on 
insufficient evidence to hold that the diagnoses of Anthony N. and Richard TT. 
were sufficiently linked to a predisposition to commit sexual offenses, thus 
rendering them no different from general recidivist offenders.58 If so, their civil 
commitment cannot be justified and would be a violation of their substantive 
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 519, 521. 
 53 See id. at 519–20, 522–23. 
 54 See id. at 523. 
 55 Id. at 522. 
 56 Id. at 523. The Mental Hygiene Law and the precedent-setting cases have thus molded a rela-
tively clear two-prong test for determining whether to civilly commit sexual offenders. See id. at 517, 
523 (citing N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(i) (McKinney 2017)). Donald DD. held that an ASPD 
diagnosis cannot support a finding of a mental abnormality if not accompanied by another diagnosis. 
Id. at 524 (citing State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 240 (N.Y. 2014)). The court of appeals found 
that the supreme court misinterpreted the holding in Donald DD. when it vacated the orders civilly 
committing Richard TT. Id. at 523. The court of appeals focused on the fact that Richard TT. also 
suffered from BPD and psychopathy, which they thought created a personality structure that required 
civil commitment. Id. at 521. 
 57 Id. at 524–25 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 58 Id. at 524. 
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stitution.59 The state is only justified in infringing on an individual’s liberty if 
they have a legitimate state interest.60 The legitimate state interest behind arti-
cle 10, Judge Rivera highlighted, is to protect the public from a particular class 
of dangerous sex offenders and to provide that group necessary treatment.61 
Judge Rivera accordingly contended that the only way for the Mental Hygiene 
Law to constitutionally civilly commit individuals is to ensure that there is a 
clear distinction between sex offenders with a mental abnormality that result in 
lack of sexual impulse control and general criminal recidivists.62 She did not 
believe the evidence was able to sufficiently make that distinction.63 
Judge Rivera founded her reasoning and uncertainty in the majority’s 
conclusions on the court of appeals decision in Donald DD.64 Judge Rivera 
argued that Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is just as common as Anti-
social Personality Disorder (ASPD), which the court held in Donald DD. was 
not alone sufficient to qualify as a mental abnormality.65 She therefore argued 
that BPD similarly does not predispose offenders to commit sexual offenses 
and should not serve as a predicate for civil commitment on its own.66 
Specifically focusing on the characteristics of the mental diagnoses, Judge 
Rivera highlighted the ways in which ASPD and BPD are similar and thus the 
reasons why the court should be bound by Donald DD. in finding ASPD and 
BPD insufficient to civilly commit the petitioners.67 She reasoned that, like 
ASPD, BPD is prevalent among the prison population, sexual impulsivity is 
not a general characteristic of BPD, and there is no evidence to support that 
sexual impulsivity, even if present, will manifest itself through sexual offens-
es.68 Judge Rivera criticized the majority for essentially employing a “combi-
nation diagnosis” theory in which the court purported that while none of the 
petitioners’ diagnoses were sufficient to establish a predisposition to commit 
sex offenses, together and based on past criminal records, the court could infer 
such a link.69 
                                                                                                                           
 59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 523 (Rivera, J., dissenting). The Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving individuals of “life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 60 Tsesis, supra note 38, at 262–63. 
 61 See MENTAL HYG. LAW art. 10; Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 523 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 62 Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 524 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See id. at 525. 
 65 See id. Judge Rivera argued that the court of appeals should be bound by the reasoning of Don-
ald DD. and, accordingly, just as ASPD accompanied by sexual crimes could not constitute a mental 
abnormality in Donald DD., neither could BPD accompanied by sexual crimes constitute a mental 
abnormality in the case of Anthony N. and Richard TT. Id. at 524–25. 
 66 See id. at 524–25. 
 67 Id. at 525. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 525–26 
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Judge Rivera found fault in the manner in which the majority fabricated 
such a relationship to support its conclusions.70 Judge Rivera contended that in 
order for the experts at trial to connect BPD to uncontrollable sexual conduct, 
they must have relied on past crimes.71 Judge Rivera argued that such a back-
ward-looking diagnosis and justification leads to misdiagnosis, especially con-
sidering the weight juries give to expert witnesses, as compared to convicted 
offenders.72 Without sufficient evidence to justify potentially permanent civil 
commitment, Judge Rivera dissented from the majority’s conclusion in Dennis 
K. that petitioners Anthony N. and Richard TT. possess mental abnormalities 
that qualify them for civil commitment.73 
III. REQUIRING CERTAINTY IN CIVIL COMMITMENT 
The majority’s opinion in State v. Dennis K. presents significant concerns 
regarding the degree of certainty the New York criminal justice system has 
come to accept before depriving citizens of their fundamental liberties.74 In-
voluntary civil commitment, like criminal imprisonment, naturally infringes on 
an individual’s liberty to be free from bodily restraint, thus raising significant 
Constitutional substantive due process concerns.75 To justify such an infringe-
ment on liberty, the government must have a legitimate purpose behind the 
infringement.76 The state interest behind civil commitment is to protect the 
public from dangerous sex offenders and provide those sex offenders with 
therapeutic treatment.77 As the dissent correctly noted, it is therefore crucial for 
the court to accurately determine by clear and convincing evidence that the 
individuals who are being civilly committed not only have a mental abnormali-
ty, but that their mental abnormality predisposes them to commit sex offenses, 
such that they pose a threat to society and would benefit from the treatment 
civil commitment offers.78 If the individuals are not dangerous sex offenders 
predisposed to commit sex offenses, the state would not have a legitimate in-
terest behind depriving such individuals of their liberty, and their commitment 
would be unconstitutional.79 As the Supreme Court correctly stated in 
O’Connor v. Donaldson, “a finding of ‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a 
State’s locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. at 526. 
 71 Id. According to article 10, a finding of mental abnormality cannot be based solely on past 
sexual offenses. Id. (citing N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07[d] (McKinney 2017)). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See State v. Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d 500, 523–24 (N.Y. 2016) (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 75 U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; Tsesis, supra note 38, at 260. 
 76 See Tsesis, supra note 38, at 260. 
 77 See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 523. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id. 
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simple custodial confinement . . . [T]here is still no constitutional basis for 
confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can 
live safely in freedom.”80 
Civil commitment under the Mental Hygiene Law is exclusively designed 
and constitutionally justified for dangerous sex offenders with a predisposition 
to commit sexual offenses.81 The focus, as the dissent accurately noted, must 
then be on ensuring that there is a distinction between dangerous sex offenders, 
justly in need of civil commitment, and general recidivist offenders, who may 
suffer from mental disorders but are not predisposed to commit sexual offens-
es.82 Although civil commitment is unquestionably necessary in certain situa-
tions, the majority inappropriately advocated for its expansion in the cases of 
Anthony N. and Richard TT., where it is unclear whether petitioners’ diagno-
ses, such as BPD, will result in sexual misconduct at all.83 In failing to make 
this distinction, and therefore potentially civilly committing general recidivist 
offenders, the majority’s decision threatens substantive due process.84 
The majority in Dennis K. inaccurately focused on the number of mental 
diagnoses, as opposed to the characteristics of the diagnoses.85 However, as the 
dissent properly highlighted, BPD, even in conjunction with ASPD, should not 
be sufficient to civilly commit individuals because the link between BPD and a 
predisposition to commit sexual offenses is unclear.86 Judge Rivera correctly 
noted that BPD, like ASPD, is widespread among the prison population, evi-
dence that BPD is not exclusive to or notable among sex offenders.87 Addition-
ally, BPD does not require sexual impulsivity as a symptom, nor does the Di-
                                                                                                                           
 80 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
 81 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW art. 10 (McKinney 2017); Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 523 (Rivera, 
J., dissenting). 
 82 See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 524 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 83 See id. at 517, 523 (majority opinion); id. at 526 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 84 See id. at 526 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 85 Id. at 512–13, 519 (majority opinion). The majority erred in inappropriately relying upon Don-
ald DD. and determining that so long as ASPD was accompanied by another disorder, the individual 
could be labeled as a dangerous sex offender in need of civil commitment. See id. at 517, 521–22. 
Donald DD. held that individuals who suffer from ASPD, alone, could not be civilly committed, as 
this disorder does not sufficiently predispose sexual misconduct. See State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 
239, 251 (N.Y. 2014). ASPD only establishes a general tendency towards criminality and has no req-
uisite relationship to difficulty controlling one’s behavior. See id. However, the court in Donald DD. 
held that ASPD in conjunction with other mental diagnoses could justify civil commitment. See id. 
Nonetheless, the decision in Donald DD. failed to adequately acknowledge that, even if ASPD is 
accompanied by another mental diagnosis, if there is no necessary relationship between the additional 
diagnosis and a predisposition to commit sex offenses, then the additional diagnosis would also be 
insufficient to classify individuals as possessing a mental abnormality. Id. 
 86 Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 526 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. at 525. Twenty-five to fifty percent of prisoners suffer from BPD. Id. Statistics show that as 
many as eighty percent of inmates in prison, currently or in the past, could be diagnosed with ASPD, 
making it incredibly common. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Anthony N. v. New York, 137 S. 
Ct. 574 (2016) (No. 16-6237). 
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agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders associate BPD with sexual 
offenses.88 On cross-examination, the State’s expert even admitted that “bor-
derline personality disorder is not a traditional diagnosis that’s been linked to 
future sexual offenses . . . .”89 Thus, even if Anthony N. and Richard TT. suffer 
from both ASPD and BPD, such diagnoses, either alone or combined, should 
not be sufficient to justify civil commitment.90 Had the court considered more 
than just the number of mental diagnoses and petitioners’ past crimes, it would 
have realized that the decision is not in compliance with the reasoning of Don-
ald DD., but in fact violates the petitioners’ substantive due process rights.91 
The lack of certainty and fallibility of predictions about future behaviors, 
even as noted by the State’s witnesses, is of most concern.92 When fundamen-
tal liberties of United States citizens are at stake, the justice system has a duty 
to ensure that the reasons behind such deprivations of freedom are justified by 
clear and convincing evidence.93 Nothing about the majority’s decision is suf-
ficiently clear or convincing.94 Additionally, the methods used by the majority 
in making inferences about the petitioners are imprecise and therefore alarm-
ing.95 Reliance on past crimes coupled with traditionally non-sexual disorders 
to infer a causal link between the two, which involves a hindsight analysis by 
experts who work backwards from a sexual offense to diagnose a mental ab-
normality, is inaccurate.96 The courts should analyze the evidence first, and 
work towards a conclusion, not vice versa.97 It is in making this link between a 
mental abnormality and a predisposition to commit sexual offenses, without 
proper evidence, that undeniably creates opportunities for misdiagnoses, and 
violates the substantive due process of civilly committed individuals.98  
As the dissent in Dennis K. appropriately acknowledges, the petitioners 
have committed heinous and unacceptable acts.99 However, individuals suffer-
ing from ASPD and BPD are not automatically predisposed to commit sexual 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 525 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 89 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 87, at 9. 
 90 See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 524–26 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 91 See id. at 526. 
 92 Tsesis, supra note 38, at 284 n.206. In Barefoot v. Estelle, the Supreme Court, as supported by 
the American Psychiatric Association, presented research to prove that psychiatrists’ predictions of 
patients’ future dangerousness were usually wrong. Id. (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900–
01 (1983), superseded on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)). Clinical studies have repeat-
edly shown inaccuracies in psychiatrists’ abilities to predict future behavior, and dangers associated 
with judicial and legislative acceptance of such predictions. Id. at 286. 
 93 See Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 526 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 94 See id. 
 95 See id. at 517–18, 523 (majority opinion). 
 96 Id. at 526 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 97 See id. 
 98 See id. 
 99 Id. 
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offenses simply due to these conditions.100 It is evident that such mentally im-
paired individuals, already politically unpopular, are predisposed to being tak-
en advantage of in our justice system, as they are often stigmatized and cannot 
properly advocate for themselves due to their mental disorders.101 Further, 
these individuals are predisposed to being prejudged by members of the jury, 
who subconsciously prefer the testimony of expert witness, experts whose 
opinions are based on hindsight reasoning.102 Before the justice system moves 
forwards in depriving such individuals of fundamental liberties, the process 
and evidence supporting their classification under the Mental Hygiene Law 
must be undeniable and sound.103 The majority’s opinion failed to demonstrate 
how such hindsight analysis and reliance on non-sexual disorders appropriately 
safeguards individuals from erroneous deprivation.104 Accordingly, it is a se-
vere violation of substantive due process to civilly commit Anthony N. and 
Richard TT.105 
CONCLUSION 
Fundamental liberty and freedom are central to our justice system, and the 
justifications behind depriving individuals of such freedoms should be clear 
and certain. The Court of Appeals of New York deprived petitioners Anthony 
N. and Richard TT. of their freedom when it held that Antisocial Personality 
Disorder (ASPD) and Bipolar Personality Disorder (BPD) were sufficient 
mental diagnoses to classify petitioners as possessing mental abnormalities, 
thereby civilly committing them under section 10.03 of the New York Mental 
Hygiene Law. 
By relying on the petitioners’ past crimes, the majority in State v. Dennis 
K. argued that, although neither diagnosis is commonly associated specifically 
with sexual impulses, the evidence was sufficient to civilly commit them. 
However, such hindsight analysis and decisions made on the possibility of sex-
ual misconduct should not justify the civil commitment of individuals afflicted 
by these diagnoses. Neither BPD nor ASPD can be said to certainly be associ-
ated with a predisposition to commit sexual offenses, a requisite prong for civil 
commitment. As such, the evidence presented by the State cannot be sufficient-
ly clear or convincing to justify the civil commitment of the petitioners or 
those similarly situated. The justice system must seek to protect those unable 
to properly advocate for themselves by requiring certainty that their mental 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See id. 
 101 See id. (discussing the disproportionate weight juries afford expert witnesses in comparison to 
the doubts juries have towards accused sex offenders). 
 102 See id. 
 103 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW art. 10 (McKinney 2017); see Dennis K., 59 N.E.3d at 526. 
 104 See id. at 524–26. 
 105 Id. at 526. 
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diagnoses are associated with a predisposition to commit sexual offenses be-
fore depriving them of their liberties through civil commitment. 
